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In this paper we defend our views against Jones (2002) claim that the criticism of the ease of predication hypothesis (Jones, 1985)
made by de Mornay Davies and Funnell (2000) is ‘‘fundamentally ﬂawed.’’ Jones raises ﬁve issues concerning the content of the text,
the reliability of eﬀects of ease of predication, the generation of predicates, semantic features, and memory retrieval. We address
each of these issues in turn and show that either a critical point raised is not made, or the point is mistaken. More importantly we
show that our empirical ﬁndings, which are entirely overlooked by Jones, unequivocally support the view that ease of predication
does not account for imageability eﬀects in performance.
 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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Jones (2002) argues that the criticism made by de
Mornay Davies and Funnell (2000) of the ease of
predication hypothesis (as described in Jones, 1985) is
ﬂawed, and that ease of predication continues to provide
‘‘a reliable and a valid semantic substrate for image-
ability’’ (p. 165). He lists four deﬁciencies in our paper:
(i) we attribute to Jones (1985) a deﬁnition of ease of
predication that is incorrect; (ii) we claim that ease of
predication is an unreliable measure, when in fact we
obtained high measures of (statistical) reliability; (iii) we
claim that the ease of predication judgements of Jones
(1985) had not been compared with the generation of
actual predicates (carried out by Jones, 1988); and (iv)
we attribute to Jones the assumption that features and
predicates are one and the same.
Before addressing these criticisms, we will consider
Jones conclusion that the concept of ease of predication
as an explanation of imageability eﬀects in reading has
not been challenged by our paper, for here we disagree* Corresponding author. Fax: +44-0-20-8411-5343.
E-mail address: paul32@mdx.ac.uk (P. de Mornay Davies).
0093-934X/$ - see front matter  2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights re
doi:10.1016/S0093-934X(03)00107-Xentirely. We believe that Jones (2002) has seriously
misrepresented the basis on which we have challenged
the ease of predication theory, as he ignores completely
the empirical sections of our paper which show that ease
of predication does not account for eﬀects of image-
ability and concreteness. When we have made our case
on this main point, we will return to consider Jones
speciﬁc comments listed above.2. Ease of predication, imageability, and concreteness
Jones (1985) set out to investigate the possibility that
ease of predication (hereafter, EoP) could provide a
more cognitively plausible account of the reading pat-
tern found in deep dyslexia than measures of image-
ability and concreteness. People with deep dyslexia (an
acquired disorder of reading) typically read aloud highly
imageable concrete words, such as horse with more
success than less imageable concrete words such as
beauty, which in turn are read more successfully than
abstract words like liberty. Function words, such as and
or the, which lack imageable/concrete properties, are
generally not read aloud at all, despite being among theserved.
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that semantically related errors (such as horse! cow)
commonly occur in deep dyslexia indicates that written
words are named aloud on the basis of their meaning.
To explain the eﬀects of imageability and concrete-
ness in deep dyslexia, Jones (1985) turned to the psy-
chological theories of meaning around at that time,
which assumed that words were associated in semantic
memory with ‘‘. . . distributions of features, or more
fully, predicates’’ (p. 2). He suggested that variations in
the ability to read particular words aloud and variations
in the imageability and concreteness of these words
might both be explained by ‘‘variations in the distribu-
tions of the associated predicates’’ (p. 3). On the basis of
this, Jones predicted that subjective ratings of the ease
with which ‘‘predicates of the stimulus words can be
summoned’’ (p. 3) should correlate highly with ratings
of imageability taken from published norms. Jones did
not deﬁne the nature of the variations in the distribu-
tions of the associated predicates, but his instructions to
subjects emphasised the ease with which a good number
of predicates might be produced to particular words,
giving as examples 10 predicates to the imageable word
dog (e.g., a dog has four legs; a dog barks when angry)
and no predicates to the abstract word idea. Jones went
on to show that EoP ratings correlated very highly with
ratings for imageability ðr ¼ :88Þ. On the basis of these
data (and other data showing that ease of predication
ratings varied with grammatical class), Jones concluded
that ease of predication oﬀers a parsimonious account of
the pattern of reading found in deep dyslexia.
Jones (1985) did not collect measures of the actual
number of predicates that subjects could generate for
the words he used. So, in our study (de Mornay Davies
& Funnell, 2000) we collected written lists of predicates
generated to a list of words, with each word presented
for 90 s. Two sets of words were mixed up in this list: 20Fig. 1. Ease of predication ratings (Jones, 1985) vs. nwords from Jones (1985) and 40 new words (taken from
Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968). In each set, half the
words were concrete and half were abstract. The number
of predicates generated to Jones word set correlated
highly (r ¼ :85, p < :01) with the ratings of EoP ob-
tained by Jones (1985) indicating a strong association
between the two. Also, the number of predicates gen-
erated for the combined word sets correlated highly with
published ratings of imageability (r ¼ :87, p < :01).
Thus our paper provides conﬁrmation of a strong sta-
tistical relationship between EoP, imageability ratings,
and the number of predicates generated (as inferred by
Jones, 1985).
However, further investigations of the relationship
between the number of predicates generated and ratings
of EoP, imageability and concreteness showed that vari-
ations in imageability and concreteness were, after all
better predictors of the number of predicates generated
than were ratings of EoP. We will explain our ﬁndings by
reference toFigs. 1–4. Fig. 1 shows that the 20words from
Jones (1985) formed a continuous range of number of
predicates generated, with abstract words producing
fewer predicates than concrete words. However, EoP
ratings for these words failed to vary systematically with
the number of predicates produced, and instead separated
concrete and abstract words into two distinct populations
distinguished by high and low EoP ratings. Within these
distinct populations, neither the concrete nor the abstract
words showed a signiﬁcant relationship between EoP
rating and the number of predicates generated (r ¼ :11
and r ¼ :29, respectively, p > :05 in both cases). Thus the
high correlation of r ¼ :85 for the Jones word set, found
between EoP ratings and the number of predicates gen-
erated clearly reﬂects variations in some other variable
than the number of predicates generated.
The concrete and abstract word sets selected from
Jones (1985) were drawn from extreme ends of theumber of predicates generated: Jones word set.
Fig. 2. Ease of predication ratings (de Mornay Davies & Funnell, 2000) vs. number of predicates generated.
Fig. 3. Ease of predication ratings (de Mornay Davies & Funnell, 2000) vs. concreteness.
Fig. 4. Ease of predication ratings (de Mornay Davies & Funnell, 2000) vs. imageability.
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concrete words¼ 5.98, range 6.17–5.81; for abstract
words¼ 2.90, range 3.15–2.43). Our new set of 40 words,
referred to above, represented a continuum of con-
creteness from high to low (mean concreteness rating for
concrete words¼ 5.83, range 4.06–6.68; for abstract
words¼ 2.82, range 2.26–3.98). We collected EoP rat-
ings for these words using the instructions from Jones
(1985). Fig. 2 shows that when the number of predicates
generated by these words is plotted against ratings for
EoP, there is again a signiﬁcant correlation (r ¼ :75,
p < :01). However, apart from a few abstract words, to
which very low numbers of predicates were generated,
and a few concrete words for which very high numbers
of predicates were generated, most estimates of the
number of predicates generated do not distinguish be-
tween concrete and abstract words. Nevertheless, EoP
ratings separate concrete and abstract words into dis-
tinct populations along the EoP axis. Again, it appears
that variations in EoP relate to a variable other than the
number of generated predicates.
While the number of predicates generated failed to
separate concrete and abstract words into the two word
groups distinguished by EoP ratings, variations across
ratings of concreteness (Fig. 3) and imageability (Fig. 4)
did distinguish between these groups. Thus, our ﬁndings
suggest that EoP ratings reﬂect diﬀerences in image-
ability and concreteness, rather than the reverse. Our
investigations thus refuted the proposal by Jones (1985)
that variations in EoP can account for both the varia-
tion in imageability found across words, and for the
eﬀect of imageability on the reading pattern found in
deep dyslexia.
We have shown unequivocally that variations in EoP
reﬂect variations in imageability and concreteness, ra-
ther than diﬀerences in the number of predicates that
words generate. We regret the failure of Jones (2002) to
comment on these ﬁndings. In our view, Jones (2002)
conclusion that contrary to de Mornay Davies and
Funnell (2000) ‘‘. . . a words predicability provides both
a reliable and a valid semantic substrate for imageabil-
ity’’ (p. 165), completely disregards the empirical ﬁnd-
ings of our paper.3. Speciﬁc criticisms of our paper
3.1. Textual content
Jones (2002) claims that we have misquoted Jones
(1985), and by so doing have misrepresented the concept
of ease of predication. He further states that our
‘‘purported deﬁnition links together features and pred-
icates’’ (p. 161). One of these criticisms is true: we have
misquoted him by mistakenly inserting the word sum-
mons into a quotation from Jones (1985). Our referenceto Jones description of ease of predication states that he
wrote ‘‘This is the ease with which any particular word
‘‘summons’’ the element representing [it] in semantic
memory [which] is associated with a number of features,
or, more fully, predicates’’ (1985, p. 2). Jones (2002)
points out that he actually wrote, ‘‘. . . the element rep-
resenting a word in semantic memory is associated with
a number of features or, more fully, predicates.’’
Our inclusion of the word summons in the quotation
is regrettable, but we do not agree that inclusion of this
word has misrepresented the EoP hypothesis as Jones
(2002) claims. He argues that ‘‘Ease of predication does
not refer to the ease with which a word summons the
element representing it in semantic memory. Rather, it
refers to the ease with which associated predicates can
be activated’’ (p. 161). He denies that he used the word
summons anywhere in his paper. However, this turns
out not to be true, for the word appears in the abstract,
to quote: ‘‘. . . the eﬀects of imageability . . . occur as a
result of variation in the ease with which individual
words summon semantic predicates’’ (p. 1). It also ap-
pears twice on p. 3, ﬁrst to explain that words access the
cognitive system ‘‘. . . by attempting to summon one or
more matching predicates,’’ and again a little further on
to explain that ‘‘. . . it is the ease with which predicates of
the stimulus word can be summoned which is the de-
terminant of its likelihood of being read correctly.’’ Our
misquotation therefore captures very accurately the
meaning Jones (1985) assigns to the concept of ease of
predication elsewhere in the paper.
Apart from the introduction of the word summons
(and the bracketed word substitutions), our quotation is
identical to that of Jones (1985). Thus we do not agree
with Jones further claim that, in our misquotation, we
erroneously link together features and predicates, since
our reference to a number of features, or more fully,
predicates is a direct quotation from his paper.
Jones (2002) also criticises us for attributing other
words to him that did not appear in Jones (1985). These
words, richer, select, narrow down, neighbours, and
ease of predication eﬀect appeared in double quotation
marks in our paper (which must be why Jones inter-
preted these as quotations from his work, although such
usage is commonplace). Most of the words that Jones
has highlighted appear in general discussions of theory,
rather than being direct references to his statements.
Thus, we suggest that words with more predicates might
produce more errors, because of the need to select one
word from many other possibilities; that visual errors in
reading are likely to occur to abstract words because
they have fewer semantic neighbours; and that the EoP
hypothesis proposes that semantic errors in reading
occur when the predicates narrow down the semantic
ﬁeld, rather than providing a precise speciﬁcation. We
do state that because Jones ease of predication measure
is argued to reﬂect diﬀerences in the number of predi-
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semantic representation of a concrete word will be
richer than that of an abstract word. This seems a
reasonable assumption and one shared by others. For
example, Plaut and Shallice (1993) also use the term
‘‘richer’’ to refer to Jones theory: ‘‘Following Jones
(1985) and others, we develop a semantic representation
in which concrete words have ‘‘richer’’ representations,
in terms of number of active features, than do abstract
words’’ (p. 398). We also state that Jones argues that
imageability eﬀects are really an ease of predication
eﬀect, but this is the main point of his paper and hardly
misrepresents his case. Thus we cannot agree with Jones
(2002) that our account of his theory ‘‘cannot be relied
on’’ (p. 161).
3.2. Reliability of predicability
Jones argues that we have ignored the fact that we
found a high degree of (statistical) reliability with which
ratings of ease of predication, on a subset of the Jones
(1985) word set, produce closely similar results across
both Jones and our study. In support of this he refers to
a statement that we make in the discussion section
claiming that ease of predication is an unreliable mea-
sure. But he fails to note that immediately following our
report of the very high correlation (r ¼ :97, p < :01)
between EoP ratings collected by Jones (1985) and
ourselves on the Jones word subset, we reported that
diﬀerent levels of statistical reliability were obtained for
the concrete and abstract words within the set (de
Mornay Davies & Funnell, 2000, p. 109). While the
concrete words produced a statistically signiﬁcant cor-
relation (r ¼ :69, p < :05) between EoP ratings across
Jones experiment and our own, the abstract words
within the set failed to do so (r ¼ :36, p > :05). On the
basis of this ﬁnding we argued that EoP ratings are not a
reliable index of imageability, since the reliability of the
ratings diﬀered with variations in concreteness of the to-
be-rated words. We went on to show that while Jones
EoP ratings for our subset of words correlated highly
with imageability ratings for the word set overall
(r ¼ :87, p < :01), neither the concrete words, nor the
abstract words within the set correlated signiﬁcantly
with variations in imageability (r ¼ :02, r ¼ :07, re-
spectively, p > :05 in both cases). Thus, we repeat the
conclusion reached by de Mornay Davies and Funnell
(2000): EoP ‘‘. . . does not accurately reﬂect predicate
distributions or diﬀerences in imageability’’ (p. 92).
3.3. Generation of predicates
Jones (2002) points out that we queried whether
Jones (1985) EoP ratings of the ease with which predi-
cates can be produced actually reﬂect this when mea-
sured directly. We did query this, quite reasonably, sincehe had not included the generation of predicates in his
1985 study. We are criticised however for not knowing
that Jones (1988) collected measures of the time it took
subjects to produce two predicates to each word and
went on to show that measures of the time taken cor-
related highly with EoP ratings. We admit the oversight.
However, our paper does not suggest, as Jones (2002)
states, ‘‘. . . that ease of predication ratings do not map
onto the actual generation of predicates’’ (p. 162), since
we ourselves showed that they do. We simply stated (as
Jones, 2002, points out) that Jones (1985) provided ‘‘. . .
no indication that Jones ease of prediction ratings map
onto the actual predicates of words’’ (de Mornay Davies
& Funnell, 2000, p. 162).
3.4. Semantic features
Jones (1985) states that ‘‘. . . a word in semantic
memory is associated with a number of features or,
more fully, predicates’’ (p. 2). As Jones (2002) points
out, we have assumed in our paper that by this he means
‘‘predicates and features are one and the same’’ (de
Mornay Davies & Funnell, 2000, p. 99). His statement
left us with little choice, since his use of the words more
fully suggested to us that he viewed semantic features as
subsumed within predicates. We did not criticise him for
this: our problem was in understanding what Jones
considered to be the diﬀerence (if any) between predi-
cates and features, since others (such as Barry, 1984,
whose theory we were contrasting) have distinguished
between the two. Jones (2002) argues that the statement
that features or more fully, predicates by Jones (1985)
indicates that he considered ‘‘. . . the term predicate as
more theoretically precise than the word feature’’ (p.
163) and that, as a result he did not mention features
further in the paper. But this does not clarify the issue of
to what extent, in his view, the concepts of features and
predicates diﬀer.
Jones (2002, p. 163) argues that the relationship be-
tween semantic features and predicates cannot be in-
vestigated empirically in the way attempted by de
Mornay Davies and Funnell (2000). He suggests that
‘‘. . . the appropriate procedure was to examine the re-
lation (between predicates and semantic features) to the
present predicational approach of speciﬁc rather than
generic theoretical characterizations of semantic fea-
tures’’ (we have added the words in parenthesis). He
gives as examples two possible interpretations of a se-
mantic feature, one by Jackendoﬀ, the other by Hinton,
Plaut, and Shallice (1993). He states that Jackendoﬀ
(1983) views semantic features as semantic primitives
(although it is worth noting, as we point out in our
paper, that Jackendoﬀ (1992) argues that concepts
cannot be broken down into conceptual primitives on
the basis of their features). In contrast, the view of
Hinton et al. (1993) accords more closely with his own.
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semantic features might be used to generate an alter-
native method of investigation to the empirical method
that we chose to use.
Jones (1988) argues that the method of predicate and
feature generation we chose is a ‘‘relatively insensitive
procedure’’ (p. 92). Nevertheless, this procedure is now
widely used and is generally viewed as a valid means of
acquiring property norm data for building connec-
tionist models (e.g., Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, &
Seidenberg, 1998; Tyler, Moss, Durrant-Peatﬁeld, &
Levy, 2000).
3.5. Memory retrieval
Jones (2002) ﬁnds further support for the role of EoP
from a study by Jones (1988), which showed that ‘‘. . .
the eﬃcacy of a word as a retrieval cue is dependant
upon its predicability’’ (p. 164). He argues from this that
EoP again provides an alternative explanation to vari-
ations in imageability or concreteness. However, the
relationship under discussion is correlational rather than
causal, so it cannot be concluded that retrieval depends
upon ease of predication. Further investigations are re-
quired. In addition, Jones (2002) cites a paper by Wil-
liams, Healy, and Ellis (1999) investigating the role of
imageability in autobiographical memory, in which
the authors reported that ratings of ease of predication
(which they refer to as predicability) and predication
time for cue words correlated very highly with im-
ageability. According to Jones (2002) ‘‘. . . the two
predicational measures tended to predict memory per-
formance better than did the imagery measure’’ (p. 164).
However, this is not the conclusion reached by Williams
et al. They attempted to separate the eﬀects of image-
ability and predicability, and their results suggested that
‘‘. . . visual imageability was the more signiﬁcant pre-
dictor in autobiographical memory when pitted against
predicability’’ (pp. 573–574). Later in the same section,
they wrote ‘‘In other words, imageability emerges as the
more powerful predictor, and without it, even relatively
highly predicable cues are weakened signiﬁcantly’’ (p.
574).4. Conclusions
In our view, none of the points raised by Jones (2002)
concerning our presentation of Jones (1985) justify his
claim that our criticisms are fundamentally ﬂawed. The
speciﬁc points raised, that we have addressed above,focus on small details of the text, and in each case we
have shown either that the point made is mistaken, or
that it does not make a critical point. More importantly,
none of the criticisms raised are directed towards the
empirical sections of our paper, which show quite clearly
that EoP varies with diﬀerences in imageability and
concreteness rather than with the number of predicates
associated with a concept. We therefore vigorously re-
ject the claim made by Jones (2002, p. 159) that ease of
predication ‘‘. . . continues to identify correctly the se-
mantic substrate of apparent eﬀects of imageability.’’
Our data and those of Williams et al. (1999) support the
view that eﬀects of imageability and concreteness on
performance in cognitive tasks cannot be explained by
ease of predication.References
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